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This paper simulates alternative distributions of general purpose state aid to local governments under different 
combinations of criteria: tax capacity, effort, and revenue needs. Revenue needs are based on Tobit estimates 
of the costs of providing average levels of 16 categories of services. Segmenting the sample into high and low 
population jurisdictions provided a more realistic set of cost estimates. Available revenues or capacity are 
determined by multiplying each jurisdiction's tax bases by standard tax rates. A Need-Capacity gap, the 
difference between needed revenues and available revenues, is used as a needs-based distribution strategy for 
general purpose aid. Finally an effort gap, based on above average tax efforts was added to the Need-Capacity 
gap to define a Need-Capacity-Effort strategy. 
The State of New York has a long history of as-
sistance to local governments. In 1946 a system of 
shared taxes was replaced with a general purpose 
aid system where the amount of general purpose aid 
was detached from specific revenue sources. The 
distribution of major portions of general purpose aid 
to local governments was and still is based on 
population and class of government. The level of 
per capita aid and, presumably, the level of service 
provided per capita is highest for cities, followed by 
towns outside villages, villages, and counties, in 
descending order. Further, the constant per capita 
amount to all jurisdictions within a class, villages for 
example, presumes that the same types of service are 
provided by all governments of the same class. The 
validity of the implicit assumptions of the aid 
formula was challenged when first implemented in 
1946 and continues to be challenged today. 
Numerous commissions, committees and studies 
have investigated the aid distribution system in New 
York (NYS Legislative Commission on State-Local 
Relations). Criticisms have been of two types: 1) the 
failure to use multiple criteria for the distribution of 
aid (for example, fiscal capacity and fiscal effort in 
addition to need), and 2) the inadequacy of 
measures currently used under the need criterion. 
The research reported here addresses both criticisms. 
The authors are Assistant Professor, Professor, and Research Associate, 
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The research reported here was carried out under contract with the New 
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The objective of this study is to develop and 
evaluate alternative methods of aid distribution based 
upon combinations of criteria, specifically, tax ca-
pacity, tax effort, and revenue needs. The devel-
opment of a measure of need that accounts for 
differential service provision costs is a necessary 
first step. Cost functions for sixteen service areas 
are estimated for a sample of jurisdictions in the 
state. Given the estimated cost functions, a measure 
of need based on the cost of providing standard 
levels of each service is predicted for each juris-
diction in the state (except New York City). Al-
ternative aid distribution methods are then simulated 
using estimated need along with measures of tax 
capacity and effort. Each step will be presented, in 
turn, preceded by a discussion of previous research 
on intergovernmental aid in New York and 
elsewhere. 
The research reported here is the second phase of 
a research project funded under contract with the 
New York State Legislative Commission on State-
Local Relations. Some of the data utilized for 
estimating the service area cost functions were col-
lected in Phase One. A rather lengthy and com-
prehensive survey instrument, completed by local 
public officials, was administered in the Spring of 
1984. For each service listed on the survey, local 
officials were asked whether or not they provided 
the service, how they produced it, how they fi-
nanced it, and whether or not they thought the 
service was mandated. 
Preliminary evaluation of the data from the sample 
of 240 New York jurisdictions (22 cities, 25 
counties, 122 towns, and 71 villages) indicates that 154     October 1987 
the presumed homogeneity of functions and service 
structures within cities, towns, villages or counties 
does not exist (Hattery, et al.}. With service level 
defined as the number of services provided within a 
general service area category, such as law en-
forcement, the data exhibits considerable variability 
in the level of services provided within types of 
government. Further, the study did not reveal any 
clear-cut local government hierarchy of service 
provision as implied by the current formula. In fact, it 
was found that some villages provided higher levels 
of services than some cities, yet all cities receive 
higher amounts of aid per capita than all villages 
under the current aid formula. 
Intergovernmental Aid 
The literature on intergovernmental aid reveals a 
great variety of specific criteria or measures for 
distributing aid. These criteria are based on three 
major concepts: fiscal capacity, effort, and need. 
Fiscal capacity is conceived as the capacity to raise 
local revenues. It is sometimes referred to as tax 
capacity in recognition of the difficulty of measuring 
user fees especially when user fees bypass the local 
government accounting system and budget by going 
direct to a private producer. Often-suggested 
measures of fiscal capacity are per capita income, 
market value of assets, full value assessment, or 
capacity as measured by a representative tax system 
such as that used by the United States Advisory 
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1982). 
Fiscal effort is a concept similar to plant utilization 
in manufacturing. It is the ratio of revenues raised to 
fiscal capacity, or the utilization rate of fiscal 
capacity. Often suggested measures are effective 
property tax rate, effective sales tax rate, or locally 
raised revenues divided by fiscal capacity-Fiscal 
needs recognizes that not all services delivered by all 
units of government are essential, that some 
minimum level of service delivery is expected of all 
units of government, regardless of their fiscal 
capacity. Measures often suggested include 
minimum service levels perhaps as reflected by 
expenditures per capita; service needs for special 
populations reflected by such measures as percent 
poor, percent children, and percent elderly; higher 
costs of achieving specific levels of service output, 
e.g., higher input costs, especially labor costs in 
metropolitan areas. 
These concepts can be used singly or in com-
bination to represent quite different strategies or 
philosophies with respect to intergovernmental aid. 
But it is the combination strategies that appear most 
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interesting in that they allow us to offer decision 
makers a variety of policy options and at the same 
time allow them to explore the effects of alternative 
weights or values on different segments of the 
American belief system. For example, a combination 
need-capacity or a need or capacity strategy could 
encourage the targeting of aid to the most needy 
jurisdictions. Addition of an effort-based bonus could 
reward those who make an extraordinary effort to help 
themselves. 
The Massachusetts system, as described by Ka-
tharine Bradbury et al., is an example of a com-
bination strategy, more specifically a needs-capacity 
strategy. The heart of the Needs-Capacity (NQ 
strategy is the calculation of a gap. The gap is 
calculated by subtracting from the needed reve-
nues, that level of revenues that would be available if 
a community taxed its tax base at some average or 
standard rate. Needed revenues could be defined as 
the cost of providing some average or standard 
level of services in the community. The gap be-
tween needed revenues and revenue capacity then 
becomes a measure of the need for intergovern-
mental aid. The need for intergovernmental aid, as 
distinguished from needed revenues, could be con-
sidered a needs-based distribution strategy for general 
purpose aid. If the gap is zero, the need for 
intergovernmental aid is zero. The key to this kind 
of needs-based aid strategy is a standard of com-
parison. Needed revenue is based not on the level 
of services provided by a jurisdiction but on ex-
penditures required to provide some standard level 
of services. 
The Needs-Capacity strategy does not provide a 
mechanism for rewarding high effort. If we can 
define an effort gap as the difference between some 
extraordinary effort and an average or standard ef-
fort, we could add the effort gap to the Need-
Capacity gap to create a Need-Capacity-Effort Gap. 
Think for example of defining extraordinary tax 
effort as the difference between tax revenue when a 
community taxes its tax base(s) at some higher-
than-average rate and that level of tax revenue it 
would receive if it taxed its tax base(s) at an average 
or standard rate. The use of the Need-Capacity-
Effort gap strategy in addition to considering the 
need for intergovernmental aid would provide an 
effort bonus to those jurisdictions that made an 
extraordinary effort to help themselves. This strategy 
along with the Need-Capacity strategy are evaluated 
in this paper. 
Estimation of Need 
Both aid distribution strategies require estimates of 
need, defined here as the cost of providing a stan- Ranney Day. and Mattery 
dard level of service. To predict need for all juris-
dictions in the state we begin by utilizing the Phase 
One sample of 240 governmental units and estimate 
indirect cost functions (Q) for each of i — 1, . . ., 16 
service areas. In general form, 
(1)     Ci=  Ci(w!, . .  .wn,qi,S), 
where the w,, j = 1, . . .,n, are input prices, q; is 
output for service area i, and S is a vector of char-
acteristics of the jurisdiction assumed to affect cost. 
This cost function assumes cost minimizing behavior 
and is convenient to use because, at least 
theoretically, it is a function of observable variables. 
Certainly, costs (or expenditures), input prices, 
and jurisdiction characteristics are directly observ-
able. However, obtaining output measures for ser-
vices is problematic. As a proxy for service output 
or level we calculated service indices based upon 
responses to the Phase One survey. By intent, the 
survey was organized in a service hierarchy or cat-
egory scheme that provided the basis for aggre-
gation into sixteen service areas: law enforcement, 
fire prevention and control, animal control, health 
services, social services, services to the aging, rec-
reation and culture, planning, highway, sewer, san-
itation, water, public transportation, community 
development, economic development, and natural 
resources. With some exceptions, the index for 
service area i (IND;), the service level, is a simple 
summed scale of the presence ( = 1) or absence ( = 
0) of provision of each service included in the 
service category. 
The empirical specification of the cost function 
for the ith service category is 
Ci = b0 + b1,LCOST + b2NLCOST 
+ b3DENTOV  + b4POPTOV 
(2)      + b5POPTOV
2  + b6INDj  + b7INDPOPi 
+ b8TOWN + b9ClTY  +b10VILLAGE 
+ b11OTHREVi + Σb(11 + n)Sn + Uj, 
where the variables are as described in Table I and 
the number of terms, n, in the summation depends 
upon service area. For example, MILEAGE would 
be included in S when estimating highway and 
perhaps other costs. Likewise, when estimating social 
service costs, the extent of poverty (POV) may be 
important. The values of these variables do not 
differ by service area, but whether they are in-
cluded does differ by service area. It was not pos-
sible to determine labor and nonlabor cost by service 
area. Hence, LCOST and NLCOST, as well as the 
variables in S, are not subscripted. Note that OTH-
REVj is not included in S because we do observe it 
for each service area. 
Because some service areas are not provided by 
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some jurisdictions, the dependent variables are limited 
with a lower bound of zero. Thus, changes in the 
explanatory variables affect not only the cost level 
for jurisdictions providing services, but may also 
affect the number of jurisdictions that do or do not 
provide services. In such limited dependent variable 
cases. Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation 
yields inefficient estimates of the parameters and 
inaccurate estimates of the expected values of the 
dependent variable. Specifically, forecasts based 
on OLS estimates can be negative. Tobit analysis 
(Tobin, 1958) avoids these problems and is utilized 
for this study.
1 
Preliminary Tobit analyses yielded projected cost 
estimates that were particularly high for low pop-
ulation municipalities. This problem, encountered 
by others, has been resolved by segmenting the 
sample by population size when analyzing local 
government expenditures (Stinson and Lubov, 1982). 
Accordingly, we estimated cost functions for high 
and low population municipalities separately and 
were able to obtain a much closer correspondence 
between actual and projected values for both groups. 
The population thresholds for segmenting the sample 
were determined for each service by inspecting 
bivariate plots of total expenditures for the service 
versus population. The plots were examined for the 
presence of a point at which the relationship be-
tween expenditures exhibited a marked change. In 
general, a population level of 8,000 was used to 
sort municipalities into the low {< 8,000) or high 
(> 8,000) group. 
The Tobit estimates of the cost functions for 
jurisdictions with populations of more than 8,000 
and less than 8,000 are presented in Tables 2 and 3, 
respectively. A sequence of likelihood ratio tests 
were conducted to obtain the final specifications 
reported in the tables. For the set of jurisdiction-
type dummy variables, F-tests were undertaken to 
determine whether the set should be included in 
the specification. If so, the coefficients are reported 
in the table. All other coefficients reported therein 
are significant at the 95 percent confidence level 
based on asymptotic t-statistics. The coefficients 
cannot be directly interpreted as marginal changes 
in total costs as would be the case if they were 
obtained from OLS. Note that for Health and Social 
Services, only counties were included because few 
towns, cities, or villages provided any of the ser-
vices within the category. The state designates 
1 An anonymous reviewer pointed out that a more flexible alternative 
approach would be to utilize the Heckman-type two-step sample-selection 
correction procedure which involves estimating a logit or probit model for 
determining the probability of providing the service, calculating a bias-
correction factor, and using that factor in OLS estimation of service costs.  
156     October 1987     NJARE' 
Table 1.     Variable Definitions   
Variable    Definition 
 
CI  =  Jurisdiction operating cost of providing service area i in (FY 1984). 
a
LCOST  =  Labor cost per jurisdiction employee (FY 1984) including wages
b and fringe benefits
3.
NLCOST  =  Nonlabor cost per jurisdiction employee (FY 1984). 
c
DENTOV  =  Density of jurisdiction. 
d 
POPTOV  =  Population of jurisdiction.
11 
POPTOV
2  =  POPTOV  x  POPTOV 
INDI  =  Jurisdiction level of service index for service area i.
INDPOPi  =  IND,  x  POPTOV                                                                                                                                                                           
TOWN  =  1 if jurisdiction is a town, 0 otherwise.
CITY  =  1 if jurisdiction is a city, 0 otherwise.
VILLAGE  =  1 if jurisdiction is a VILLAGE, 0 otherwise (omitted category is COUNTY).
OTHEREVi  =  Revenues from other municipalities for provision of services within service area i
a
S 
 
=  Jurisdiction characteristics including percent in poverty (POVERTY), percent over 65 years of age (ELDERLY), percent 
youth (YOUTH), education levels (ED), percent of housing with plumbing (PLUMBING), and road mileage (MILEAGE). 
e
:| Source: New York State Comptroller's Bureau of Municipal Research and Statistics within the Division of Municipal Affairs. 
b Source: New York State Public Employee Retirement System and Police and Firemen's Retirement System database. 
c Calculated by subtracting labor cost from total operating cost and then dividing by the number of employees for each jurisdiction. 
d Source:  1980 Census of Population and Housing. For towns with villages, the village population has been deducted from the 
total. Hence POPTOV and DENTOV reflect a town-outside-viilage (TOY) adjustment. 
e Sources: The mileage data were obtained from the New York State Department of Transportation and the remaining variables 
from the 1980 Census of Population and Housing.   
counties to administer most social services. A sim-
ilar argument can be made for Health, although 
many towns, cities, and villages do provide some 
health services. For Planning, two equations were 
estimated, one for counties and one for towns, cities, 
and villages. No Planning index was calculated for 
counties due to inconsistencies in the survey 
instruments between counties and towns, cities, 
and villages. Therefore, town-city-village and county 
planning costs were estimated with and without an 
index term, respectively. For these services, the 
split by population size was not undertaken. There-
fore, the results for these services are included in 
Table 2 but not Table 3. Because the primary pur-
pose for estimating the cost functions is to forecast 
standard need levels for simulation purposes, only a 
general analysis of the Tobit results will be un-
dertaken. 
To determine whether jurisdiction types explain 
differences in service provision costs, dummy var-
iables for municipal type (town, city, and village) 
were included in the cost function specifications, 
where appropriate. For high population jurisdic-
tions, fourteen of the cost functions were specified 
with jurisdictional dummy variables. Table 2 shows 
that for seven of these fourteen services municipal 
types significantly affected costs. In Table 3, six 
of the thirteen service cost estimates for low pop-
ulation jurisdictions are significantly affected by 
the municipal-type variables. There is not an exact 
correspondence in terms of which service costs are 
significantly affected by municipal types between 
the two population size groups. Even within a size 
group the relative magnitudes differ a great deal 
across jurisdiction types and services. 
Preliminary specifications of the cost functions 
included a number of variables (S) hypothesized to 
affect service provision costs depending upon the 
service area. As reported in the tables, the only two 
variables that significantly do so are MILEAGE 
and BELOWPOV. MILEAGE may be reflecting 
service level for those with positive coefficients 
among high population jurisdictions [Law, 
Highway, Sanitation, Water, Economic De-
velopment, and Natural Resources) and low pop-
ulation jurisdictions (Law, Fire, Highway and 
Sanitation). The negative coefficients of MILE-
AGE for the cost of providing Sewer and Trans-
Dortation by high population jurisdictions may be 
reflecting some economics of size. With the ex-
:eption of BELOWPOV, which has a large effect 
3n the cost of Community Development services 
for high population jurisdictions, none of the socio-
iemographic variables such as percent elderly were Table 2.   Tobit Estimates of Service Cost Functions for Municipalities with Population ≥ 8,000 
SERVICE AREA 
 
Law 
CONSTANT 
 
-67.0 
 
LCOST 
 
NLCOST 
 
DENTOV 
 
0.9 
POPTOV
 
-134.5 
POPTOV
2
 
0.130 
IND 
 
INDPOP   TOWN 
 
7.34 
CITY 
 
VILLAGE
 
OTHREV
 
MILEAGE 
19.6 
BELOWPOV
 
R
2 
.97 
 
 
 
Fire  -3,019.6          -0.034   6.51       1,958.5  5.152.0 2,768.6       .79  
Animar  31.0        1.4 -0.001               .30  
Health"  46,224.0  -3,563.7  456.9  54.5       0.94         NA  NA NA       .89  
Social Services'
1  134.340.0  -3,176.9  376.7    -466.7   •3,605.9 29.78         NA  NA NA       .98  
Aging 
 
120.4 
 
 
 
 
 
  4.0 
 
    -829.3 
 
-1,320.6
 
-4.839.9 
 
      .59 
 
 
Recrealion                               
& Culture'  -3,271.1        51.1 -0.012   -0.34     2,943.0  3,461.0 3,017.4       .79  
Highway  3.3        46.2 -0.019   -2.13       8.0   .87  
Sewer  -1,738.1        33.1 -0.009 452.0 -1.31       -6.0   .84  
Sanitation  -3,967.4 
 
      31.7 -0.106   4.39     2,865.9  3,120.8
 
3,582.2 6.24 3.3   .92  
Water  -7,416.7          -0.026   4.99     7.991.5  7,924.8 7.179.8   4.9   .%  
Transportation  -2,082.3        36.7 -0.022   2.98       -9.0   .71  
Planning (Co)
1"  -507.6  28.3      0.9   NA NA          NA  NA NA       .60  
Planning (TVCi)
d  -94.8  2.3          3.6 0.20        NA            .71  
Communily                               
Development"  -90,007.5        26.6 -0.023   1.27     4.532.5  5,518.8 6.548.5     34,238.0 .53  
Economic         
Development  -796.1          0.003           2.6   .70  
Natural         
Resources  -60.1          0.003 46.98 -0.43      -220.9  -99.5 -143.57   0.6   .94  
J Population cutoff is 5,750 rather than 8,000.       
b Includes all counties and no towns, villages, or cities. 
c No index available.       
d Counties excluded. 
NA = not applicable. This indicates that the variable was excluded from the specification. Table 3.   Tobit Estimates of Service Cost Functions for Municipalities with Population < 8,000
a 
SERVICE AREA  CONSTANT  LCOST  NLCOST DENTOV POPTOV POPTOV2 IND 1NDPOP  CtTY
h VILLAGE
h OTHREV MILEAGE R-
Law  -291.6  16.8  -1.6         3.9  185.5 75.9 0.0014   .7
3
Fire  - 20.5  1.8  -0.2     1.07     148.3 4.7 0.0011   66
Animal
0  -1.6  0.1 
 
-0.1 -0.001 1.05               .3
9
Aging  -1.6  -0.2 
 
    2.20 -0.22 0.70   - 15.7 -2.9     .2
5 
Recrealion                           
& Culture"  -31.2  2.0  -0.2         0.5  36.1 13.0     .3
2 Highway  -12.1  3.7  -0.5         4.4  93.9 13.2 0.0015 3.1 .7
8
Sewer  -150.9      0.031   2.71 28.04           .7
3
Sanitation 
 
-37.5 
 
2.0 
 
-0.3 0.008       3.3 
 
    1.5893   .6
2
Water 
 
-246.6 
 
      33.14   40.53           .2
4
Transportation  -29.4            15.35           .1
5
Community                           
Development  -20.6            3.05   4!. 7 8.7     .1
0 Economic                           
Development  -5.2            1.39           .1
3 Natural                           
Resources  -17.8  0.4      3.24 -0.38 2.50           .2
7
a Only thirteen of the sixteen services are reported here. As noted in the (exl the other three, Planning, Social Services, and Health are treated differently. The results for those services ure 
reported in Table 2. 
b Only cify and village dummy variables are included. No counties were included in this population size group. Therefore, the omitted dummy variable is TOWN. 
c Population cutoff is 5,750 rather than 8,000. Ranney Day, and Mattery 
enificant. It may be the case that total population 
verwhelms differences in characteristics within the 
Opulation in determining costs. Of particular interest 
is the fact that at least one 
f the two terms based on our calculated service 
•ndices (IND and INDPOP) is significant for eleven 
Of thirteen and thirteen out of sixteen of the service 
areas provided by low and high population juris-
dictions, respectively. The significance of these terms is 
important for two reasons. First, the significance Of 
the service level indices suggests that we may have 
made a first step toward solving a problem that has 
plagued researchers for some time, the lack Of a 
useful proxy for service level or output. Second, 
specific values of each service area index are used 
as proxies for the standard service levels in the 
simulations. 
Calculating Standard Need 
The cost function estimates provide the basis for 
predicting the cost of providing a standard level of 
each service for every jurisdiction in the state. To 
predict these costs, the weighted average of the 
service level index (AVEIND) and that average 
multiplied by actual population (AVE1NDPOP) re-
place IND and INDPOP for prediction purposes. The 
weights were used to correct for differences in 
distribution of municipal types in the sample 
compared to the state. Thus, AVEIND and AVE-
INDPOP, along with actual values for the remaining 
variables are multiplied by the corresponding 
estimated coefficients from Table 2 or 3 and trans-
formed through the Tobit framework to obtain Cfj, 
the cost to the jth jurisdiction of providing a standard 
level of the ith service. The method by which these 
standardized costs are utilized for projecting needed 
revenues is described in the following sec-don on 
simulation. 
Simulation 
In the remainder of this paper we will be concerned 
with utilizing these cost estimates and other data 
from the financial accounting system to simulate the 
effects of alternative general strategies and specific 
policy options on the distribution of per capita state 
aid. The two general strategies to be investigated are 
combination strategies: a Need-Capacity gap and a 
Need-Capacity-Effort gap. The policy options will 
include alternative standard tax rates and alternative 
weights on Need-Capacity and Effort gaps. 
It is assumed that all jurisdictions are held harm-
less at the current dollar amounts of per capita aid 
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and the simulations are concerned only with pos-
sible changes in the formula for the distribution of 
appropriations above the hold harmless level. The 
appropriations to be distributed under the new al-
ternatives are assumed to be at the $100 million 
level. 
The general framework of taxation will be held 
constant. For example, only counties and cities will 
be allowed to levy a sales tax. City and county 
sales tax rates may change but the limit on local 
sales tax rates of 3 cents (with exceptions for a few 
jurisdictions) remains. All jurisdictions retain the 
right to levy a tax on real property but the tax rate 
will be allowed to vary. All other taxes and fees are 
assumed to be held constant at the FY1984 levels, 
i.e., only the rates on real property and county and 
city sales tax rates will be allowed to vary. New 
taxes are not considered. 
In equations (3) through (7) below, the general 
procedure will be to: a) define and compute Needed 
Revenue (NR) and Revenue Capacity (RC) and use 
these calculations to compute a need-capacity gap 
(NCGAP) for each jurisdiction; b) calculate an effort 
gap (EGAP) for the jurisdictions making an 
extraordinary effort to raise revenues; and c) add 
the effort gap to the need-capacity gap to form a 
need-capacity-effort gap (NCEGAP) strategy. 
Needed Revenue is defined as 
 
(3)   
 
where:       NRj =  Needed Revenue in the jth ju-
risdiction, 
CGGj = total operating cost of general   
              government support activities in                
              the jth jurisdiction,  
C
s
ij = the total operating cost of pro-    
         viding the ith service at the sth   
         standard level 
the C
s
ij are calculated as described in the previous 
section. 
It should be noted that an accounting system 
designed for maintaining accountability does not 
include depreciation on buildings or other invest-
ments. Also, while operating costs were estimated 
for average levels of service, alternatives such as a 
standard deviation unit above or below the average 
could be considered. 
Revenue Capacity for jurisdiction j is defined as 
(4) RCj = Bijt
s
1 + B2jt
5
2 + Kj, 
where:    BIJ  = the real property tax base at full    
                       value assessment in the jth juris  
                       diction   
              t
s
1  = the standard real property tax rate 160     October 1987 
B2j  = the county (or city) sales tax base         
t
2
s = 
 the standard county (or city) sales     
           tax rate 
Kj = other income to the government of 
jurisdiction j, included fees, user 
fees, other property taxes, federal 
and state aids and income derived 
from services performed for other 
governments. 
Any analyst initiating work of this kind would 
be well advised to become acquainted with the 
idiosyncrasies of the state accounting system. In 
New York for example, county sales tax revenues 
may be distributed to cities, towns and villages via a 
sales tax credit against the property tax levied by the 
county in those jurisdictions. Thus county property 
tax revenues must be adjusted to include those sales 
tax credits before the revenue is divided by full-
value assessment to obtain the property tax rate. 
Other states probably have a large number of 
pitfalls of this type. 
Average tax rates were assumed as the initial 
definition of a standard tax rate. City sales tax rates 
were averaged over 61 cities including a zero for 
the 33 cities which chose not to levy a sales tax." 
County sales tax rates were averaged over 57 counties 
including a zero for four counties that chose not to 
levy a county sales tax.
3 
Property tax rates were averaged over all 1,606 
jurisdictions. It might be argued that the property 
tax rate should be averaged within type of juris-
diction, that is within counties, cities, villages and 
towns. Note that cities typically levy higher tax 
rates than do other jurisdictions. To compute an 
average property tax rate for cities and to use that as 
the standard rate of utilization of the property tax 
base would appear to constitute a bias against 
cities. For example, for any given minimum level of 
service, the need-capacity gap would be smaller for 
cities (because of the higher tax rate for cities) and 
the amount of aid received by cities would be 
proportionately lower. Thus the standard property 
tax rates were derived from the average across all 
1,606 jurisdictions. 
The Need-Capacity gap is defined as 
(5)        NCGAPj  -  NRj  -  RCj 
s.t. NRj > RCj. 
As a first step in developing another strategy for 
2 For the 33 cities with no sales tax, the authors estimated a sales tax 
base using data from 26 cities that have sales tax bases and are in counties 
with sales taxes. 
3 The State Department of Taxation and Finance provided estimates of 
sales tax yield at a three cent sales tax level for four counties that did not 
levy a sales tax. This allowed the authors to compute a sales tax base for 
those counties. 
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the distribution of general purpose aid an effort gap 
is calculated as   
(6)        EGAPj = OSRj  - (Bijt
s
1 + B2jt
s
2), 
s.t. OSRj > Bijt
s
1 + B2jt
s
2, 
where:    OSRj = own source revenue or total rev enue   
                            less state and federal aids  
                B2jt
8
1 = revenue from taxing the full value   
                               assessment of real property at 
                             standard rate  
 
B2jt
5
2 = revenue generated by a sales tax; 
when sales are taxed at a standard 
rate for that class of jurisdiction of 
which j is a part. 
The Need-Capacity-Effort gap is defined as 
(7)     NCEGAPj =  aiNCGAPj +  a2EGAPj, 
where:     a1  =    the weight to be attached to the need-
capacity gap 
a2 =  the weight to be attached to the ex-  
traordinary effort as measured by  
the effort gap. 
Finally, within any particular strategy or policy 
option the distribution of general purpose aid to a 
jurisdiction is given by 
   
(8) 
 
Using standard spreadsheet software, the effects  of 
alternative strategies and policy options on the 
distribution of per capita aid are simulated. Within 
the two general strategies, Need-Capacity and Need-: 
Capacity-Effort, the alternatives were limited to two 
different tax rates (average and one standard 
deviation unit below average) and alternative weights 
on need-capacity and effort gaps. The procedure can 
easily accommodate different standard levels of 
service, but the results using alternative levels of 
services are not presented here. 
The results of eight simulations are presented in 
Table 4. As a means for interpreting these results, 
first consider the effect of adding effort as a criterion 
for distributing aid. Holding tax rates constant at the 
average level and then at one standard deviation 
below the average (low rate) implies comparing 
columns 1, 3, 5 and 7 of Table 4 for average rates 
and 2, 4, 6 and 8 for low tax rates. In each case 
adding an effort bonus shifts the distribution toward 
counties and cities and away from villages and 
towns. The shift is exaggerated as higher weights are 
placed on effort, compare for example columns 5 
and 7 at average tax rates or columns 6 and 8 at low 
tax rates. 
Lowering the standard tax rate shifts the distri- Table 4.   Simulation Results for Alternative Aid Distribution Strategies: AVERAGE NEEDS
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  15)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
      NCE  NCE  NCE  NCE  NCE  NCE  Current   
  NC  NC  Avg. Rates Low Rates Avg. Rates Low Rates Avg. Rates Low Rates Aid Current
  Avg.  Low  High Wt. High Wt. Equal Equal High Wt. High Wt. Distri- Expendi-
  Rates  Rates  onNC
a  onNC"  Weights  Weights  on Effort"  on Effort
b  bution  tures
L 
          -    - Average  Dollars   -    -         
County  604,843  624,622  786,603  747.693  851,893  796,960  905,979  840,085     
City  271,187  225,886  316,161  274,379  332,316  293,791  345,699  310,783     
Town  27,465  34,258  20,252  27,758  17,661  25,156  15,514  22,879     
Village  43,158  34,849  31,390  27,568  27,163  24,654  23,661  22,102     
          -    -     Percer  itages      -    -         
County  34  36  45  43  49  45  52  48  12  63 
City  16  14  19  17  20  18 21  19  52  15 
Town  25  31  19  25  16  23  14  21  27  16 
Village 
 
24 
 
19 
 
17  15  15  14  13  12  9  6 
u Weight on NC = 2, weight on E = 1. 
b Weight on NC = 1, weight on E = 2. 
c Expenditures are total operating expenditures for 16 services analyzed in this report. 162     Oaober 1987 
bution of aid toward counties and towns and away 
from cities and villages when effort is not included 
as a criterion. In contrast if effort is included among 
the criteria, lowering the standard tax rate shifts the 
distribution toward towns only and away from 
counties, cities and villages. This shift in distri-
bution takes place at all weights on effort considered 
in this analysis. 
The final two columns of Table 4 allow some 
interesting comparisons with each other and with 
different aid distribution strategies. First, note that 
while counties currently make 63 percent of the 
actual operating expenditures for the sixteen ser-
vices, they receive only 12 percent of the current aid 
distribution. In contrast cities currently make 15 
percent of the expenditures for services but receive 
52 percent of the current aid distribution. The gap 
strategies, providing between 34 and 52 percent of 
the aid to counties, represent a middle ground between 
the current distribution of aid and of expenditures. 
The gap strategies, providing between 14 and 21 
percent of the aid to cities are more closely aligned 
with the distribution of expenditures than with the 
current distribution of aid. 
In order to gain some insight into the distribu-
tional effects of the different strategies it is useful to 
define the most needy jurisdictions and compare on a 
per capita basis the distribution of aid to those 
jurisdictions with that to other jurisdictions. For 
example, define needy jurisdictions in terms of need-
capacity where the need is defined as the costs of 
each of the services at a standard level plus the costs 
of general government support and the capacity is 
defined as the income generated by taxing the tax 
base(s) at the standard tax rate plus all other income 
including federal and state aid. Further, we define the 
most needy jurisdictions as those 10 percent with the 
largest gap between needed revenues and available 
revenues. Note that a large gap between needed 
revenues and available revenues could arise from 
either high costs of providing a standard level of 
services or lower available revenues resulting from 
lower tax bases. It is useful to make these 
comparisons on a per capita basis as shown in Table 
5. 
As expected all aid distribution strategies inves-
tigated here gave markedly more aid to the most 
needy of the counties, cities, villages and towns. But 
the ratio of aid for the most needy to that for the 
average jurisdiction was by no means uniform across 
strategies. For example, at average tax rates 
comparing columns 1, 3, 5 and 7 for counties, it is 
seen that the addition of an effort bonus lowers the 
ratio of the amount received by the most needy 
counties to that received by the average county and 
that tendency is exaggerated as the weight on effort 
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increases. This statement is also true for cities towns 
and villages. Using a comparison of columns 2, 4, 6 
and 8 reveals the same conclusions for lo\v tax rates. 
Clearly if the objective is to give the most aid to the 
most needy governments of each type  the need-
capacity gap is the preferred strategy followed in 
order by need-capacity-effort with high weight on 
NC, NCE with equal weights and NCE with high 
weight on effort. 
Making comparisons across types of govern-
ments, note that for all strategies, cities receive the 
largest per capita aid followed in order by villages 
counties, and towns. But the spread from top to 
bottom, cities to towns, is largest for NC strategies 
and decline as effort is added as a criteria and that 
decline in spread continues as effort receives a higher 
weight (compare columns 1,3,5 and 7 for average 
tax rates and 2, 4, 6 and 8 for low tax rates). 
Although cities and villages would receive higher 
amounts of aid than counties on a per capita basis, 
the higher population in counties would mean that 
the aggregate amount of aid going to counties would 
far exceed that going to any other type of jurisdic-
tion. 
Formulating the information on gainers and losers 
as shown in Tables 4 and 5 portrays the difficult 
political tradeoffs facing decision makers regarding 
intergovernmental aid. Table 5 clearly demonstrates 
that all the need-capacity and need-capacity-effort 
strategies analyzed here target aid distribution 
toward the most needy jurisdictions in contrast to the 
uniform rate per capita provided to each class of 
jurisdiction under the current per capita aid grant 
formulas. But on the other hand, compared to the 
status quo as reflected in column (9) of Table 4, 
all of the need-capacity and need-capacity-effort 
approaches involve substantial redistribution of aid 
away from cities with counties and villages being 
the major beneficiaries. Because of this major de-
parture from the status quo, it seems likely that the 
adoption of any of these strategies would be fea-
sible only if the program were designed as an in-
crement to the current aid distribution. 
This research provides a framework for designing 
alternative methods for distributing state aid to local 
governments in New York State. The particular 
strength of this innovative methodology is the fact 
that all suggested alternatives rest on a solid 
foundation of service cost estimation. This foun-
dation could be further strengthened with additional 
research. The current estimation procedure, with a 
cost function estimated for each service category, 
presumes that there are no tradeoffs between ser-
vices when cost conditions change. A joint esti-
mation procedure, wherein all service cost functions 
are estimated at the same time, would allow for Table 5.   Comparison of Effect of Alternative Strategies on Aid Distribution Per Capita to the Most Needy Jurisdictions
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  NCE NCE NCE  NCE NCE NCE
  NC  NC  Avg. Rates  Low Rates  Avg. Rates  Low Rates  Avg. Rates  Low Rates 
  Avg. Low High Wt. High Wt. Equal  Equal High Wt. High Wt.
  Rates Rates on NC
a  onNC
a  Weights  Weights  on Effort
b  on Effort
b 
        -    -    -   Do liars per Capita       
Average 10% Most Needy Counties  30.40  23.54  16.66  14.55  11.72  10.95  7.63  7.80 
Average All Counties  7.02  5.82  5.43  4.91  4.86  4.55  4.39  4.23 
Average 10% Most Needy Cities  45.02  32.13  26.18  20.57  19.42  15.94  13.81  11.89 
Average All Cities  15.78  12.46  12.25  10.54  10.99  9.77  9.94  9.10 
Average 10% Most Needy Towns 
 
23.41  19.11  13.25  12.09  9.60 
 
9.29  6.58  6.83 
Average All Towns  4.50  5.49  3.05  4.17  2.53  3.65  2.10  3.18 
Average 10% Most Needy Villages 
 
50.01  38.52  28.81  24.20  21.19  18.47  14.88  13.45 
Average All Villages 
 
8.48  7.48  6.66  6.24  6.00 
 
5.74  5.46  5.30 
          Ratios -    -       
Aid to Most Needy Counties/                 
Aid for Average County  4.33  4.01  3.07  2.96  2.41  2.41  1.74  1.84 
Aid to Most Needy Cities/                 
Aid for Average City  2.86  2.58  2.14  1.95  1.77  1.63  1.39  1.31 
Aid to Most Needy Towns/                 
Aid for Average Town  5.20  3.48  4.34  2.90  3.79  2.55  3.13  2.15 
Aid to Most Needy Villages/                 
Aid for Average Village  5.90  5.15  4.33  3.88  3.53  3.22  2.73  2.54 
a Weight on NC = 2, weight on E = 1. 
b 
Weight on NC - 1, weight on E - 2. 164     October 1987 
interaction between services and is a logical next 
step for further research. This approach may add 
further insights into alternative methods for dis-
tributing state aid to localities in New York and 
elsewhere. 
References 
Bradbury, Katherine L., Helen F. Ladd, Mark Perrault, Andrew 
Reshovsky and John Yinger. "State Aid to Offset Fiscal 
Disparities  Across  Communities,"  National Tax Journal 
37<2):151-169, June, 1984. 
Mattery, Michael R., Christine K. Ranney, Lee M. Day, David J. 
Allee and Duane E- Wilcox. "Services Provided by Local 
Governments in New York State," A. E. Res. 86 
NJARE 
-29, Department of Agricultural Economics, Cornell TI 
versity, Ithaca, New York, December, 1986.   
Heckman, James.  "Sample  Selection Bias as a Specificat 
Error," Econometrica. 74(January 1979):153-161        
New York State Legislative Commission on State-Local ft 
lations.  New  York's Revenue Sharing at the Crossroad 
Albany, New York, March, 1985.   
New York State Department of Transportation. 1983 Hiehn 
Mileage Report for New York State. NYSDOT, Planni 
Division, Data Services Bureau, Transportation Statist! and 
Analysis Section, Albany, New York, May, 1934 
Stinson, Thomas F. and Andrea Lubov, "Segmented Reere sion, 
Threshold Effects, and Police Expenditures in Small Cities, 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 65(4):738-746, 
November, 1982. 
U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernment Relations. Tax 
Capacity of the Fifty States: Methodology and Estimates M-
134. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Of' fice. 
March, 1982. 
 
 